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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jayson L. Woods appeals from his judgment of conviction, asserting that the district court
violated his Confrontation Clause rights by permitting a data acquisition and recovery technician
to testify via Skype video conferencing, and that the district court committed fundamental error,
violating his right to be free from double jeopardy, by failing to merge his conspiracy charge
with the robbery, and thus, the murder, charges.
In regard to the Skype testimony issue, Mr. Woods addresses the State’s preservation and
harmless error arguments.  In regard to the merger issue, the State’s argument on the first prong
of the fundamental error test misapplies the applicable test under the Idaho Constitution and
misreads  the  relevant  law.   The  State’s  argument  on  the  third  prong  of  that  test  represents
mistaken understanding of how the remedy analysis impacts the analysis as to whether the error
prejudiced Mr. Woods.  As such, this Court should reject those arguments and remand this case
for an order vacating the duplicitous charge.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Woods’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I. Whether the district court erred by permitting Steve Barrios to testify via Skype?
II. Whether the district court committed fundamental error by imposing sentences for both
the conspiracy charge and the felony murder charge in violation of Mr. Woods’s right to




The District Court Erred By Permitting Steve Barrios To Testify Via Skype
A. Introduction
Mr. Woods submits that district court erred by permitting Steve Barrios to testify via
Skype because the State failed to establish an important public policy necessary to excuse
traditional in-court testimony.  Mr. Woods responds to the State’s argument that his arguments
regarding Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2 are not preserved and that any error is harmless.
B. The District Court Erred By Permitting Steve Barrios To Testify Via Skype
1.  Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2
On appeal, Mr. Woods noted that, although not addressed by the parties or the district
court below, that Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2 provided:
Forensic testimony may be offered by video teleconference. For testimony by
video teleconference to be admissible:
(a) Witness Visible to Participants. The forensic scientist must be visible to the
court, defendant, counsel, jury, and others physically present in the courtroom.
(1) The  court  and  the  forensic  scientist  must  be  able  to  see  and  hear  each  other
simultaneously and communicate with each other during the proceeding.
(2) The defendant, counsel from both sides, and the forensic scientist must be able
to see and hear each other simultaneously and communicate with each other
during the proceeding.
(3) A defendant who is represented by counsel must be able to consult privately
with defense counsel during the proceeding.
(b) Written Notice Required. The party intending to submit testimony by video
teleconference must give written notice to the court and opposing party 28
days before the proceeding date.
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(c) Written Notice of Objection or Affirmative Consent. A party opposing the
giving of testimony by video teleconference must give the court and opposing
party written notification of objection or affirmative consent at  least  14 days
before the proceeding date.
(d) Party Responsible for Coordinating. The party seeking to introduce
testimony by video teleconference is responsible for coordinating the
audiovisual feed into the courtroom. Nothing in this rule requires court
personnel to assist in the preparation or presentation of the testimony provided
by the provisions of this rule.
The testimony must be recorded in the same manner as any other testimony in the
proceeding.
I.C.R. 43.2.  (See Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)  Mr. Woods asserted that, to the extent the Rule is
considered in this issue, the Rule conflicted with Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).  The
State asserts that this issue is not preserved because it was not addressed by the district court.
(Respondent’s Brief, p.18.)  The State is incorrect.
The issue in this case, both in the district court and on appeal, is whether it violated
Mr. Woods’s Confrontation Clause rights to have Mr. Berrios testify via a two-way
videoconference.  Citing State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271 (2017), the State argues that
because  the  Rule  was  not  considered  in  district  court,  in  cannot  be  considered  on  appeal.
(Appellant’s  Brief,  p.18.)   Mr.  Woods  agrees  with  the  State  that  neither  party  nor  the  district
court addressed the Rule in the district court.  However, Garcia-Rodriguez has nothing to do
with this case.
In Garcia-Rodriguez,  the  district  court  determined  that  an  officer  lacked  reasonable
grounds to arrest the defendant pursuant to an Idaho statute. Id. at 274.  The State appealed, and
raised a new theory not raised in the district court:  whether the arrest was valid pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment. Id.   This  Court  reaffirmed  its  prior  decisions,  where  “we  have  generally
held that this court will not review issues not presented to the trial court, and the parties will be
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held to the theory on which the cause was tried.” Id. (quoting Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 82
(1968).  Because the State was asserting a wholly new theory for relief, this Court declined to
address the issue. Id.
Here, the argument and the theory is the same:  that the two-way videoconference
violated Mr. Wood’s Confrontation Clause rights. Garcia-Rodriguez does not require that every
relevant authority for an issue be presented to the district court; it just prohibits new issues.  See
also Ada County Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 142 n.2 (2017) (explaining
that arguments in support of a position on a substantive issue may evolve on appeal so long as
the “substantive issue” was raised below, and therefore ACHD’s arguments citing to statutory
provisions which had not been referenced below were properly made on appeal).  And there can
be no doubt that the Rule is relevant to the issue; indeed, the State itself cites the Rule as a basis
for this Court to affirm the judgment just prior to making the argument that Mr. Woods’s claim is
not preserved.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.18.)  Mr. Woods submits that the State cannot have it both
ways:  if the Rule cannot be considered in determining whether the district court erred, then the
State cannot take advantage of the Rule and assert it as a basis to affirm.
The Rule is simply a relevant authority for this Court to consider in deciding the issue
raised.  Mr. Woods is not raising a new issue by discussing the Rule, he is simply arguing that to
the extent the Rule is in conflict with United States Supreme Court precedent that is relevant to
the constitutional issue raised, the precedent controls.
2. Harmless Error
Next, the State contends that “an error is harmless if the State proves beyond a reasonable
doubt that the verdict would have been the same had the error not occurred.”  (Respondent’s
Brief, p.21 (citing State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584 (2013); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010)).
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The harmless error test articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), applies in
cases of objected-to error. See Perry, 150 Idaho 209. Under the Chapman harmless error
analysis, where a constitutional violation occurs at trial, and is followed by a contemporaneous
objection, a reversal is necessitated, unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error  complained  of  did  not  contribute  to  the  verdict  obtained. Id.   In  fact,  the  United  States
Supreme Court has rejected the formulation of the harmless error test the State now advocates.
See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (“The inquiry, in other words, is not
whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would have surely rendered,
but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the
error.”) (emphasis from original). The State has been unable to show that the error complained
of did not contribute to the verdict.
The State asserts that “Mr. Berrios’ testimony only related to the foundational procedure
by which Detective Lukasik access the data in Woods’ phone.  However, Detective Lukasik had
already testified, without objection, that Mr. Berrios had extracted the data and provided him a
forensic image of Woods’ phone.”  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.21-22.)  Because of this, the State
asserts that evidence of Mr. Woods’ phone would still have been admitted into evidence.
However, the State never asserts that Detective Lukasik’s testimony was used to admit
the extraction report itself; it simply quotes Detective Lukasik’s testimony stating that he
received an image and printed it off.  Mr. Berrios’ testimony laid the foundation for the
extraction report (State’s Exhibit 200), which was only admitted after Mr. Berrios testified.
(Tr., p.1437, Ls.7-8.)  There would have been insufficient foundation for the report absent
Mr. Berrios’ testimony because he was the one who actually performed the data extraction.
Thus, it was only through Mr. Berrios’ testimony that the jury was able to consider the evidence
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in  that  extraction  report.   Because  of  this,  Mr.  Woods  submits  that  the  State  has  failed  to
demonstrate  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  error  complained  of  did  not  contribute  to  the
verdict.
II.
The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Imposing Sentences For Both The
Conspiracy Charge And The Felony Murder Charge In Violation Of Mr. Woods’s Right To Be
Free From Double Jeopardy
A. Proper Application Of Idaho’s Pleading Theory Reveals That Convictions For
Conspiracy And The Felony Murder Should Have Been Merged Under The Idaho
Constitution
On the first prong of the fundamental error analysis, the State improperly mixed the
standards for the test under federal Constitution and Idaho Constitution to argue there is no
constitutional violation because “not all the elements in conspiracy to commit robbery are pled in
robbery.”   (Respondent’s  Brief,  p.34.)   However,  the  question  of  whether  the  elements  of  one
offense are encompassed by the elements of the other (i.e., whether the elements of one would be
pled as part of the other) is the test under the federal Constitution, and Mr. Woods has raised this
issue under the more-protective Idaho Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79,
87 (2016).
The analysis in Sepulveda demonstrates the difference.  Rather than just looking at the
elements of the two offenses in question, the Court in Sepulveda looked to the language of the
charging document and found that “[n]either Count II nor Count III makes reference to whether
L.M. was a witness or whether Sepulveda did or did attempt to intimidate, influence, impede,
deter, obstruct, or prevent L.M. from testifying.” Id. at 88 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted) (emphasis added).  Thus, the analysis in Sepulveda focused on whether the
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charging document alleged conduct in one charge that would also speak to the alleged violation
in the second charge (i.e., whether it was the means or method by which the other charge was
committed). Id.
The State’s argument, however, looks more generally to whether all the elements of
conspiracy were pled in the robbery.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.34.)  First, that analysis ignores half
of the relevant analysis because it ignores the possibility that the conspiracy charge could fully
encompass the substantive offense, and thus, be the greater offense. See, e.g., State v. Gallatin,
106 Idaho 564, 570 (Ct. App. 1984) (vacating the conviction on the substantive offense because
the conspiracy was the greater charge in that case).  Second, by focusing on whether the elements
of one charge were plead as part of the elements of the other, the State’s argument would
essentially recast Idaho’s pleading test in a way that would make it equivalent to the federal test.
That is improper because, as the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held, the test under the
Idaho Constitution affords broader protections than its federal counterpart. See, e.g., State v.
McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841 (2013); State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 435 (1980).  Rather,
as Sepulveda demonstrates, the analysis is not on the elements themselves, but whether the facts
alleged in the charging document, in the charges themselves, speak to the elements of both
charged offenses. See Sepulveda, 161 Idaho at 87-88.  Since the State’s argument misconstrues
the appropriate test, this Court should reject the State’s argument.
Properly applying Idaho’s pleading theory, it is clear that the conspiracy and the
substantive offense are included offenses in Mr. Woods’ case.  The allegations in the charging
document allege that Mr. Woods participated in the conspiracy by driving various other
participants  to  different  locations  before  sharing  in  the  proceeds  of  the  clandestine  effort.
(R., pp.33-34.)  Those acts are the same by which he “aided, abetted, assisted, facilitated, and/or
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encouraged” the actual robbery.  (See R., pp.33-34.)  As a result, unlike Sepulveda, the alleged
facts  in  regard  to  the  conspiracy  charge  also  speak  to  the  elements  of  the  robbery  charge  (and
thus, the resulting murder charge).  Since they are included offenses, imposing multiple
punishments for that single criminal conduct violates the Idaho Constitution’s protection against
double jeopardy. See, e.g., Sepulveda, 161 Idaho at 87.
The State also attempts to draw a similarity between Mr. Woods’ case and the Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho 647, 648 (2014).  (Respondent’s Brief,
p.23.)  In that case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the question of whether conspiracy
and the substantive offense need to merge if they are included offenses is a question on which
the Supreme Court has not directly spoken. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 648; but see State v.
Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097 (1987).  However, the Court did not need to answer that question in
Sanchez-Castro because it concluded the allegations did not overlap at all; the only similarity
was a reference to the goal of the conspiracy. See Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 648-49.  Since
the offenses in Sanchez-Castro were not included offenses, the Court did not consider whether,
when the conspiracy and the substantive offense are included offenses, that would trump the
general rule that conspiracy does not merge with the substantive offense. See id. (quoting
Gallatin, 106 Idaho at 567).
The language of the charging document in Mr. Woods’ case contradicts the State’s
assertion that a similar conclusion is appropriate here.  While the alleged goal of the conspiracy
was, indeed, to take property from Mr. Nelson (R., p.33), Mr. Woods’ alleged participation in the
conspiracy was not limited to possessing the property in question (i.e., achieving the goal of the
conspiracy) as it was in Sanchez-Castro.  Rather, Mr. Woods’ alleged participation in the
conspiracy was by driving various participants in the conspiracy to different locations before
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receiving a portion of the money taken.  (R., pp.33-34.)  Thus, the charging document in
Mr. Woods’ case does more than just refer to the goal of the conspiracy, and so, this case is
distinguishable from Sanchez-Castro.
More importantly, the acts by which Mr. Woods was alleged to have participated in the
conspiracy were the same acts by which he aided, abetted, assisted, facilitated, and/or
encouraged the actual robbery.  As such, his case directly asks the question that was left open
after Sanchez-Castro – whether, when conspiracy and the substantive offense are included
offenses,  the  Idaho  Constitution  requires  those  two  convictions  to  merge.   The  answer  to  that
question is “yes” because allowing the two convictions to coexist would amount to multiple
punishments for the same criminal conduct, which would violate the constitutional protections
against double jeopardy.  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-20.)
Finally, the State argues that there is no need for merger because, under I.C. § 18-204,
there is no distinction between principals and abettors.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.28.)  However,
the State misunderstands I.C. § 18-204.  That code section eliminates any distinction in the
culpability of the principal and the abettor – an abettor is equally guilty of committing the
overarching  offense  as  the  person  who  actually  committed  the  act  constituting  the  offense.
I.C. § 18-204.  However, even within the language of I.C. § 18-204 itself, a distinction remains
in regard to the means by which an abettor and a principal actually commit the overarching
offense:  “All persons concerned in the commission of a crime . . . whether they directly commit
the act constituting the offense or aid and abet in its commission . . . .” Id.  Therefore, the State’s
argument under I.C. § 18-204 is meritless.
In fact, the State’s argument is contradicted by Sterley and Gallatin, in which Idaho’s
appellate  courts  found  that  an  abettor’s  convictions  on  the  substantive  offense  and  the  related
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conspiracy charge needed to merge even though I.C. § 18-204 was in effect at the time both
cases were decided. See 1994 Idaho Laws Ch. 131 § 2; 1972 Idaho Laws Ch. 336 § 1.  As such,
I.C.  §  18-204  does  not  change  the  conclusion  that  the  dual  convictions  in  Mr.  Woods’  case
violate his state constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.
Since the failure to merge the conspiracy and murder convictions in this case violated
Mr. Woods’ state constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy, the first prong of the
fundamental error analysis is satisfied in this case. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226
(2010).
B. The Error Is Clear From The Face Of The Record
The State’s argument on the second prong of the fundamental error analysis is essentially
a  reiteration  of  its  arguments  on  the  first  prong.   (See Respondent’s Brief, p.36.)  As such, no
further reply is needed.  That there are multiple punishments imposed for the same charged
conduct is clear from the face of the record, and that means this prong of the test is met. See
State v. Vasquez, 163 Idaho 557, ___, 416 P.3d 108, 113 (2018) (holding that, where there was
no need for additional information for the appellate record to show that the trial court failed to
follow I.C.R. 23(a), the record established a clear violation of the defendant’s right to a trial by
jury); State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 221 (2014) (explaining that, where additional facts were
not needed to identify the constitutional violation, the error was clear from the record, such that
the defendant had satisfied the second prong of the Perry analysis).
C. Regardless Of What The Proper Remedy Is, The Error Prejudiced Mr. Woods
Finally, the State contends that any error in this regard is harmless based on its mistaken
understanding of Mr. Woods’ argument about the appropriate remedy.  (See Respondent’s Brief,
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p.36 (mistakenly asserting that Mr. Woods argued that conspiracy was the lesser included
offense, but then arguing that it should be the conviction that survived).)  As an initial matter, the
State’s argument is irrelevant to the analysis on the third prong of the Perry analysis. See Perry,
150 Idaho at 226 (requiring only that the defendant show the error prejudiced him).  Regardless
of what the proper remedy is, the district court’s failure to merge the two convictions based on
the same charged criminal conduct resulted in Mr. Woods being punished multiple times for the
same criminal conduct.  That is prejudice resulting from the error sufficient to satisfy the third
prong of the Perry analysis.
At any rate, the State’s assertion that Mr. Woods has argued that conspiracy is the “lesser
included” offense misrepresents his argument and ignores the controlling precedent on that point.
Mr. Woods specifically relied upon the Court of Appeals’ precedent in regard to the remedy for a
double jeopardy violation in Gallatin.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.19-20.) In that case, the Court of
Appeals held that, since the acts alleged in regard to how the defendant aided in the substantive
offense were the means or method by which the defendant participated in the conspiracy, the
substantive offense was the conviction which had to be vacated. Gallatin, 106 Idaho at 570; see
id. at 570 (Burnett, J., dissenting particularly in regard to the remedy analysis).  Effectively,
Gallatin held that the substantive offense was the “lesser” offense. See id.  As such, Gallatin
demonstrates why the Court of Appeals has urged caution in the use of the terms “greater” and
“lesser” in regard to included offenses – those terms are often misleading.  See,  e.g.,  State  v.
Gilman, 105 Idaho 892, 896 (Ct. App. 1983).  In fact, the Supreme Court has illustrated that
point by holding there is no problem with the fact that a conviction for inattentive driving
subjecting the defendant to an arguably-greater penalty than reckless driving even though the
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relevant statute says inattentive driving is a “lesser included offense” of reckless driving. State v.
Parker, 141 Idaho 775, 779 (2005).
More importantly, though, Gallatin remains the only authority to directly address the
remedy question in light of a double jeopardy violation. Cf. Sterley, 112 Idaho at 1101 (the
Supreme Court simply remanding for the district court to determine which count merged, and the
district court would have been bound to follow Gallatin in making that determination).
Therefore, the State’s assertion that Mr. Woods argued the conspiracy was the lesser included
offense is mistaken; all he has argued is that they are included offenses, and per the holding in
Gallatin, the substantive offense is the one which should be vacated.
Notably, the State has not argued that Gallatin is manifestly wrong or should be
overruled.  (See generally R.)  In fact, since Gallatin and the Supreme Court’s subsequent
decision in Sterley are consistent with the other precedent discussed supra, they are not
manifestly wrong. See also Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 648 (citing Gallatin with approval);
State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 842 (2013) (citing Sterley with approval).1  Rather, the State
has only argued Gallatin and Sterley should be limited to the context of the now-repealed
I.C. § 18-301.  (See Respondent’s Brief, p.35.)  That argument is mistaken since the test under
that former code section was similar to the test that this Court applies under the Idaho
Constitution. See, e.g., Bates v. State, 106 Idaho 395, 401-02 (Ct. App. 1984) (applying the
pleading theory analysis to a claim raised under I.C. § 18-301); cf. Sterley, 112 Idaho at 398-99
(noting that, because it focused on the “same act or omission,” rather than the “same offense,”
I.C. § 18-301 was more protective even than the state constitution, though the Supreme Court
1 The McKinney Court ultimately did not evaluate the double jeopardy claim in that case because
it held the claim was not properly raised through a motion under I.C.R. 35. McKinney, 153
Idaho at 842.
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still evaluated whether the acts could be separated into distinct temporal units, as opposed to
alleging different aspects of the same act, to determine if there was a violation of the statutory
protection).  Therefore, Gallatin and Sterley remain useful in understanding how Idaho has
understood the protection against double jeopardy and the test which Idaho has applied in that
regard.
Even if this Court decides to abandon Gallatin’s reasoning about the proper remedy, that
does not mean this Court should ignore the clear violation of Mr. Woods’ constitutional rights, as
the State’s argument about the remedy analysis rendering the issue harmless essentially asks this
Court to do.  Rather, in that scenario, this Court should take this opportunity to definitively
answer the question left open in Sanchez-Castro and remedy the clear violation of Mr. Woods’
constitutional rights by remanding this case to the district court “with instructions to vacate the
judgment of conviction and the sentence on one or the other of the two charges,” just like the
Supreme Court did in Sterley. See Sterley, 112 Idaho at 1101.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Woods requests that his convictions be vacated and his case remanded for further
proceedings.  Alternatively, he requests that this Court remand this case with instructions to
simply vacate Mr. Woods’s conviction and sentence on the murder charge.
DATED this 21st day of August, 2018.
/s/ Justin M. Curtis
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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